Fibring is a powerful mechanism for combining logics, and an essential tool for designing and understanding complex logical systems. Abstract results about the semantics and proof-theory of fibred logics have been extensively developed, including general preservation results for metalogical properties like soundness and (sufficient conditions for) completeness. Decidability, however, a key ingredient for the automated support of the fibred logic, has not deserved similar attention.
Introduction
Fibring is a powerful and appealing mechanism for combining logics, proposed in its general form by Dov Gabbay in [18, 19] . Owing to its fundamental character, abstract formulation and compositional nature, fibring is a key ingredient of the general theory of universal logic [5, 6] . Due to the ubiquity of its underlying problems, fibring is also a valuable tool for the construction and analysis of complex logics, a subject of ever growing importance in application fields like software engineering and artificial intelligence (see, for instance, the FroCoS series of events and publications in [17] ).
Given two logics L 1 and L 2 , fibring combines L 1 and L 2 into the smallest logical system for the combined language which extends both L 1 and L 2 (see [9] ). Despite the long track of work on fibred logics, leading to a substantial understanding of the semantics and proof-theory of combined logics (see [3, 8, 10, 34, 36, 41] ), automated support for fibred logics is still non-existent. This happens, in particular, because decidability preservation results are lacking. The only general result related to (but still distant from) the decidability of fibred logics is [13] , where the preservation by fibring of the semantic notion of finite model property is studied. There is also a proof of decidability preservation of fusion (fibring) of modal logics [40, 20] , but which uses ideas and results from modal semantics that cannot be easily generalized.
Indeed, at first sight, one might be tempted to use semantic arguments to address the decidability of fibred logics. However, this semantic path is far from clear, as we do not know of a generally satisfactory semantic counterpart of fibring that naturally relates models of the component logics with models of the combined logic. Similarly, decision results about combined equational theories [31, 30, 37, 2, 38, 33] do not help, in general, first of all because the component logics do not need be algebraizable (as in [7] ), and ultimately because the fibred logic may fail to be algebraizable even if the component logics are [25, 16] .
Therefore, we shall address the decidability preservation problem directly, by taking advantage of a complete characterization of the mixed patterns of reasoning that may emerge in fibred logics, which we develop also in this paper. For the purpose, and given the inherent difficulty of the problem, we restrict our attention to the simpler case of disjoint fibring, where the logics being combined do not share connectives, and obtain a complete description of what can be derived from any set of hypotheses in the fibred system, based on what can be derived in the component logics being fibred. This characterization extends the partial results of [28] about reasoning without hypotheses, and of [27] about reasoning from non-mixed hypotheses. Although this characterization result is at the very heart of our decidability preservation result, its importance goes far beyond this application, as we discuss in the concluding remarks. In order not to take the focus of the paper from its main subject, decidability preservation, we decided to leave the (very technical) proof of our mixed reasoning characterization result to the appendix. Still, owing to the relevance of the results, the appendix is written not as a technical annex but as a section per se.
The main contribution of this paper, building upon the above mentioned characterization of mixed reasoning, is a full account of the decidability of disjointly fibred logics. Our proof of decidability preservation is constructive, in the sense that we show how to put up a decision procedure for the combined logic using decision procedures for the component logics. Further, we study the complexity of the decision procedure thus obtained, and show that it only worsens the added complexity of the components by a polynomial factor. Additionally, the other way around, we also provide a complete analysis of the reflection of decidability from disjoint fibring to the component logics. This paper is the third of a series of papers [28, 27] where we attacked the problem of understanding the mechanism of fibring the harder way, by trying to capture more and more about how a disjointly fibred logic emerges from its component logics. In particular, our decidability preservation result directly generalizes the result of [28] about deciding theoremhood. Note, however, that deciding theoremhood is enough in logics whose consequence relation can be characterized by its theorems, e.g., via some form of deduction theorem.
In Section 2, we shall recall or introduce a number of relevant notions, and fix notation to be used in the remainder of the paper. Section 3 provides a short introduction to fibring, analyses mixed reasoning in fibred logics, and states our characterization result about mixed reasoning for disjoint fibring. Section 4 is devoted to our decidability preservation results, and to a detailed study of the complexity of the decision procedures obtained. In Section 5, we draw conclusions, and discuss directions for further research. Finally, in the Appendix, we present in detail the results that characterize mixed reasoning in disjointly fibred logics, of which our account of decidability can be seen as an application.
Preliminaries
In this section we recall the essential concepts that we are dealing with in this paper, and introduce some useful notions, notations, and simple results.
Syntax
A signature is a N 0 -indexed family Σ = {Σ (n) } n∈N0 of sets. The elements of Σ (n) are dubbed n-place connectives. Being indexed families of sets, the usual set-theoretic notions can be smoothly extended to signatures. We will sometimes abuse notation, and confuse Σ with the set ( n∈N0 Σ (n) ) of all its connectives, and write c ∈ Σ when c is some n-place connective c ∈ Σ (n) . For this reason, the empty signature, with no connectives at all, will be simply denoted by ∅.
Let Σ, Σ be two signatures. We say that Σ is a subsignature of Σ , and write Σ ⊆ Σ , whenever Σ (n) ⊆ Σ (n) for every n ∈ N 0 . Expectedly, we can also define the intersection Σ∩Σ = {Σ (n) ∩Σ (n) } n∈N0 , union Σ ∪ Σ = {Σ (n) ∪ Σ (n) } n∈N0 , and difference Σ \ Σ = {Σ (n) \ Σ (n) } n∈N0 of signatures. Clearly, Σ ∩ Σ is the largest subsignature of both Σ and Σ , and contains the connectives shared by Σ and Σ . When there are no shared connectives we have that Σ ∩ Σ = ∅. Analogously, Σ ∪ Σ is the smallest signature that has both Σ and Σ as subsignatures, and features all the connectives from both Σ and Σ in a combined signature. Furthermore, Σ \ Σ is the largest subsignature of Σ which does not share any connectives with Σ.
Given a signature Σ and a set P of variables, the generated set of formulas is the carrier set L Σ (P ) of the free Σ-algebra generated by P . In the sequel, we shall assume that signatures are countable and sets of variables are denumerable. We assume fixed a denumerable set P of variables. If Σ is a countable signature then L Σ (P ) is clearly denumerable.
We define the set of variables occurring in ϕ to be either var(ϕ) = {p} when ϕ = p ∈ P , or var(ϕ) = n i=1 var(ϕ n ) when ϕ = c(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) for formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ L Σ (P ) and c ∈ Σ (n) . Analogously, we also define the set of subformulas of a formula ϕ to be such that sub(ϕ) = {p} when ϕ = p ∈ P , and sub(ϕ) = {ϕ} ∪ n i=1 sub(ϕ n ) when ϕ = c(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) for formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ L Σ (P ) and c ∈ Σ (n) . We extend these notations to sets of formulas in the obvious way.
As usual, we further define the size of a formula to be such that size(ϕ) = 1 when ϕ = p ∈ P , and
If ϕ ∈ L Σ (P ) then we define the head of ϕ to be either head(ϕ) = p when ϕ = p ∈ P , or head(ϕ) = c when ϕ = c(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) for formulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ L Σ (P ) and c ∈ Σ (n) . Clearly, if
is the instance of ϕ by σ, sometimes denoted simply by ϕ σ , and is the result of uniformly replacing each variable p ∈ P occurring in ϕ by σ(p). When Γ ⊆ L Σ (P ) we use Γ σ to denote {ϕ σ : ϕ ∈ Γ}. This allows us to define the composition of substitutions in the obvious way: given a substitution ρ :
Logical consequence
A logic (over signature Σ) is a tuple L = Σ, , where : 2 LΣ(P ) → 2 LΣ(P ) is a consequence operator (see [39] , for instance), that is, it satisfies the following properties:
for every Γ, ∆ ⊆ L Σ (P ) and σ : P → L Σ (P ). Note that we do not require, in general, that the logic is finitary, i.e., it may happen that Γ properly contains the union of all Γ 0 for finite Γ 0 ⊆ Γ. Meaningful examples of logics that will be used throughout the paper will be presented below. As usual, we shall confuse the consequence operator with its induced Tarskian consequence relation. Thus, given ϕ ∈ L Σ (P ), we will write Γ ϕ whenever ϕ ∈ Γ . When Γ = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } is finite we write ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ϕ instead of {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } ϕ. Moreover, as usual, if Γ = ∅ we write ϕ instead of ∅ ϕ, and dub ϕ a theorem of L. A formula ϕ that is not a theorem of L but such that ψ ϕ for any ψ ∈ L Σ (P ) is dubbed a quasi-theorem, or simply a q-theorem. Clearly, ϕ is a q-theorem of L provided that ϕ but p ϕ for some p ∈ P that does not occur in ϕ. It is immediate that a logic cannot both have theorems and q-theorems.
We shall call any Γ ⊆ L Σ (P ) such that Γ = Γ a theory of L, and denote the set of all theories of L by Th(L). It is well known that Th(L) constitutes a complete lattice under the inclusion ordering (see [39] , for instance). The bottom theory of the lattice is ∅ , whereas the top theory is L Σ (P ), also called the inconsistent theory. When (Γ σ ) is inconsistent for every substitution σ : P → L Σ (P ) we say that Γ is -explosive.
Note that the notion of explosion we consider is slightly more elaborate than is usually presented. Clearly, given p ∈ P \ var(Γ), we have that Γ is -explosive if and only if Γ p. However, our definition is subtly different when P = var(Γ). For instance, in a minimal logic Σ,
This is due to the fact that the logic does not encompass a mechanism to infer an arbitrary formula. Clarifying this aspect, explosiveness can be given the following alternative characterization.
. . an enumeration of P , P ∩ Y = ∅, and consider Proof.
, and prv ϕ,σ (y) = y for y ∈ Y . Concerning the first statement, if Γ is -explosive then, in particular, Γ nxt p 0 . Reciprocally, let us assume that Γ nxt p 0 and take any substitution σ and formula ϕ ∈ L Σ (P ). By structurality, we get that and let prv = prv ϕ,id where id is the identity substitution and ϕ is any formula. By structurality, we get that
as prv is a left inverse of nxt,and we conclude that Γ ψ.
Of course, all inconsistent logics are trivial. Moreover, easily, a trivial logic is consistent if and only if it has a q-theorem, if and only if all formulas are q-theorems, if and only if it has no theorems.
We say that a logic L = Σ , extends L = Σ, if Σ ⊆ Σ , and ⊆ , in the sense that
It is perhaps more common to express these properties in terms of the induced consequence relations. Clearly, L extends L when Γ ϕ implies Γ ϕ for all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L Σ (P ). Furthermore, the extension is conservative precisely when Γ ϕ if and only if Γ ϕ.
Decidable logics
There are several different flavors of decidability that make sense when applied to a logic L = Σ, , some more standard than others (see, for instance, [39] ). Herein, we say that L is decidable if there is an algorithm D such that, for each finite set Γ ⊆ L Σ (P ) outputs an algorithm D(Γ), which given any formula ψ ∈ L Σ (P ) always terminates and outputs:
Of course, with this definition, we are deciding only the finitary part of L. There many well known decidable logics, like classical or intuitionistic propositional logics. Any trivial logic is also (trivially) decidable. However, many interesting logics are undecidable, such as Anderson and Belnap's logic of entailment E [39, 1], Belnap's system R of relevant implication [4] , or several many-dimensional modal logics, e.g.,
(Trans)finite sequences
Along the paper, we will need to deal with (not necessarily finite) sequences of objects. Typically, these objects will be formulas of some logic, and the sequences will correspond to deductions in that logic. Let A be a set (of objects). Given an ordinal η, we use a = a κ κ<η to denote a η-long sequence of elements of A, or simply a η-sequence, understood as a function from {κ : κ < η} to A. As usual, if τ ≤ η, the sequence a κ κ<τ will be dubbed a prefix of a.
Note that when η is a limit ordinal, a η-sequence does not have a last element. On the contrary, if η is a successor ordinal, and in particular a finite ordinal, then a η-sequence a = a κ κ<η can be understood as a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a η−1 , and may also be represented by a κ κ≤η−1 . The 0-sequence (empty sequence) is simply not represented.
The η-sequence a = a κ κ<η is said to be injective/surjective if it is injective/surjective as a function. We will dub as A any injective and surjective sequence based on A.
Hilbert calculi
A Hilbert calculus is a pair H = Σ, R where Σ is a signature, and R ⊆ 2 LΣ(P ) × L Σ (P ) is a set of inference rules. Given ∆, ψ ∈ R, we refer to ∆ as the set of premises and to ψ as the conclusion of the rule. When the set of premises is empty, ψ is dubbed an axiom. A rule is said to be finitary if it has a finite set of premises, and H is said to be finitary of all the rules in R are finitary. Note that we do not impose finitariness, in this paper, though most of the examples used are finitary. An inference rule ∆, ψ ∈ R is often denoted by ∆ ψ , or simply by ψ1 ... ψn ψ if ∆ = {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } is finite, or by ψ if ∆ = ∅. Given Σ ⊆ Σ and P ⊆ P , a Hilbert calculus H = Σ, R induces a consequence operator
H is the least set that contains Γ and is closed for all applications of instances of the inference rules in R, that is, if The definition of L H above is arguably too abstract, as it does not highlight the sequence of rule applications that leads one to conclude that Γ H ϕ, when that is the case. Let us be more detailed. Given Σ ⊆ Σ , P ⊆ P , and Γ ⊆ L Σ (P ), a H -derivation from Γ is a (not necessarily finite) sequence ϕ = ϕ κ κ<η of formulas in L Σ (P ), for some ordinal η, such that, for each κ < η, either ϕ κ ∈ Γ, or there is ∆ ψ ∈ R and σ : P → L Σ (P ) with ψ σ = ϕ κ and ∆ σ ⊆ {ϕ τ : τ < κ}.
The fact that ϕ is a H -derivation from Γ is denoted by Γ H ϕ. We say that such a derivation is a H -proof from Γ of each of its formulas, as it is clear that any prefix of a H -derivation from Γ is also a H -derivation from Γ.
Clearly, Γ H ϕ precisely if ϕ has a H -proof from Γ, that is, there exists some H -derivation ϕ κ κ<η from Γ such that ϕ = ϕ κ for some κ < η. Of course, in that case, ϕ ι ι≤κ is a H -proof of ϕ from Γ ending in ϕ.
Given a logic L = Σ, , we can easily associate with it a Hilbert calculus H L = Σ, , where the consequence operator in the former is replaced by the induced consequence relation (seen as a set of rules) in the latter. It is easy to check that L H L = L (see [39] , for instance).
When a Hilbert system is identified with a subscript H = H name we drop the H in Hname and write just name . Analogously, we will use L name to denote the logic L Hname .
Fibred logics
In this section we recall the definition of fibred logics, explore their mixed syntax, and state our characterization result for mixed reasoning in the case of disjoint fibring.
Fibring
A direct characterization of this fibred logic can be most easily given by first defining the fibring of Hilbert calculi.
Given Hilbert calculi H 1 = Σ 1 , R 1 and H 2 = Σ 2 , R 2 let their fibring be the Hilbert calculus
Clearly, besides joining the given signatures, which will allow us to build so-called mixed formulas, the fibring of the two calculi consists in simply putting together their rules, thus allowing a form of mixed reasoning.
We can now give a simple characterization of the fibring of two logics L 1 and L 2 :
is obtained by a (possibly transfinite) sequence of alternate applications of 1 and 2 using substitutions σ : P → L Σ12 (P ).
Both for logics and Hilbert calculi, when there are no shared connectives, i.e. Σ 1 ∩ Σ 2 = ∅, the fibring is usually said to be unconstrained, or disjoint.
It is worth taking a look at some simple examples in order to better understand how mixed reasoning emerges in fibred logics.
Example 3.1. Let us first consider an example of disjoint fibring, starting from the Hilbert calculi:
• H neg = Σ neg , R neg , where Σ neg has a unique 1-place connective ¬, and R neg has the rules p ¬¬p ¬¬p p p ¬p q ,
• H cnj = Σ cnj , R cnj , where Σ cnj has a unique 2-place connective ∧, and R cnj has the rules
Clearly, L neg and L cnj correspond, respectively, to the negation-only and conjunction-only fragments
is, however, a strict subsystem of classical logic. For instance, one has ¬¬(p ∧ (¬¬q)) q ∧ (¬¬p), but ¬¬¬(p ∧ p) ¬p. Checking that indeed ¬¬(p ∧ (¬¬q)) q ∧ (¬¬p) is quite straightforward. Let us look at the mixed-derivation below, in the center, as well as at how one can view the derivation from the local perspectives of L neg and L cnj , in grey, on the sides.
The proof sequence at the center is simple, and reaches the conclusion by departing from the given hypothesis, indicated by H, using interleaved applications of rules from L neg and L cnj , indicated by ¬ -R and ∧-R, respectively. If one thinks only from the side of L neg , however, it is clear that conjunction formulas correspond to unknowns, which we represent in skeletal form by using x ϕ instead of ϕ. More concretely, x ϕ represents an atomization of ϕ, understood as a monolith, in the sense that ϕ's head connective does not belong to Σ neg , and therefore no ¬ -R rule can take advantage of ϕ's structure. As a consequence, each step of the proof sequence that corresponds to a ∧-R simply introduces an additional hypothesis, indicated by H*. The same thing happens, mutatis mutandis, on the L cnj -side with respect to negated formulas and ¬ -R rules.
Showing that ¬¬¬(p ∧ p) ¬p is expectedly harder. One could use a number of more or less common semantic tricks, but our aim here is to be able to prove such negative properties directly. For the moment, just note that, precisely because of the monolithical nature of a formula with head connective from one logic when looked at from the point of view of the other, the hypothesis ¬¬¬(p ∧ p) will essentially unfold to ¬ 2n+1 (p ∧ p) with n ∈ N 0 , and conjunctions thereof, which is clearly insufficient to access the (p ∧ p) that will remain protected by at least one negation. Below, we will provide a rigorous account of this fact, which will take advantage, in an essential way, of the fact that the signatures of the component logics are disjoint.
Disjointness is the key ingredient that guarantees that, as the example above suggests, the interaction between the component logics is only relevant with respect to monoliths (subformulas) of the formulas given. To emphasize this fact, let us analyze a different example. Example 3.2. For a simple but interesting example of non-disjoint fibring, let us consider the signature Σ tonk with a unique 2-place connective tonk, and the following Hilbert calculi:
• H tonk(intr) = Σ tonk(intr) , R tonk(intr) , where Σ tonk(intr) = Σ tonk and R tonk(intr) has the rule p tonk(p, q) ,
, where Σ tonk(elim) = Σ tonk and R tonk(elim) has the rule
is Prior's tonk system, inducing a consistent but trivial logic. Namely, p tonk q as can be easily observed from the mixed-derivation below.
Contrarily to Example 3.1, a clearcut syntactical separation of the mixed-reasoning between L tonk(intr) and L tonk(elim) in this derivation is not possible, as tonk is a shared connective. Indeed, the essential interaction between the component logics, in this case, is provided precisely by the formula tonk(p, q), which is not a subformula of p nor q.
The previous example illustrates the most essential difficulty related to non-disjoint fibring: an arbitrarily complex shared formula (or in a general a formula whose head is a shared connective) may be obtained on one of the component logics and then its structure explored by the other logic.
Mixed syntax: monoliths and skeletons
As illustrated above, in the context of fibring, it is useful to discriminate the structure of mixed formulas with respect to the syntax of each of the component logics.
Let Σ ⊆ Σ be signatures. We shall call a Σ-monolith of ψ ∈ L Σ (P ) to any outermost subformula of ψ whose head is in Σ \ Σ. The set Mon Σ (ψ) of all Σ-monoliths of ψ is defined as follows:
We extend the notation also to sets of formulas, using
We shall now consider a reasonable way of defining the perspective, from the point of view of Σ, that one may have of a formula in L Σ (P ), by exchanging monoliths with skeletal variables. For the purpose, we use a denumerable set
as follows:
We call skel Σ (ψ) the Σ-skeleton of ψ. Clearly, skel Σ (ψ) is obtained from ψ by substituting each of its Σ-monoliths φ by the variable x φ . Of course, in this context, x φ is only useful if head(φ) ∈ Σ \ Σ. Example 3.3. Recall Example 3.1. Taking the mixed formula ψ = (¬p ∧ q) ∧ ¬(¬¬q ∧ ¬p) we have that
Note, in particular, that the subformula ¬¬q is not a Σ cnj -monolith of ψ because it occurs inside the (outermost) monolith ¬(¬¬q ∧ ¬p). For the same reason, ¬p is only a Σ cnj -monolith of ψ because it also occurs outside ¬(¬¬q ∧ ¬p). Hence, we have that
Of course, the operation of taking skeletons of formulas is revertible using an appropriate substitution.
where the substitution
Proof. Immediate, as the operation of instantiation by unsk is a left inverse of skel Σ .
Mixed reasoning and disjoint fibring
be two logics, which we assume fixed for the remaining of this section, and
be their fibring. Assume also that the fibring is disjoint, that is,
The following definition is in hand, with the purpose of using the variables in X, which we used above to define skeletons, in order to represent contextual information regarding the alternation between uses of 1 and 2 in 12 -derivations. For convenience, below, we work with
where the extra variable x * will be used to represent in 1 some generic provable formula in 2 , or vice-versa.
Definition 3.5. Let Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L Σ12 (P ) and i ∈ {1, 2}. We define:
Γ ω is a saturation of Γ consisting of all subformulas of Γ that can be proved from Γ in the fibred logic, using only a finite number of alternations between the component logics, where each alternation only produces other subformulas of Γ as lemmas. Although the definition of Γ ω may seem involved, it turns out that it coincides, as a consequence of the proof of Proposition 3.8 below, with {φ ∈ sub(Γ) : Γ 12 φ}. Our definition is however better suited for practical use, as it depends only on the component logics. 
At the light of Proposition 3.8 below, it is worth noting that variable x * is only meaningful in the case when one of the component logics has theorems and the other has quasi-theorems and, even so, only when analyzing mixed reasoning without hypotheses. X i Γ (ψ) contains the Σ i -skeletons of all the Σ i -monoliths of ψ which are provable from Γ in the fibred logic. Obviously, the skeleton of a monolith over the same signature is simply a variable in X.
Example 3.6. Extending Examples 3.1, 3.3, the following equalities hold for the fibred logic L cnj • L neg , for any Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L Σ cnj ∪Σneg (P ).
It is worth noting that while in the first and second lines ∅ ω and {p} ω are computed in 0 steps, in the third line it takes 3 iterations to compute {p ∧ (¬¬(q ∧ ¬r))} ω , namely because we cannot extract q without first extracting ¬¬(q ∧ ¬r) in the L cnj side, and then q ∧ ¬r in the L neg side.
Next we prove a useful technical lemma about substitutions of the following form: given γ ∈ L Σ12 (P ),
Moreover, if ψ ∈ sub(Γ) and
as shown in Lemma 3.4, and unsk γ (x * ) = γ, which allows us to conclude that (
If ψ ∈ sub(Γ) we know that Γ = ∅ and thus x * ∈ Γ i . Let γ ∈ Γ and consider the substitution unsk γ . From Γ i i skel Σi (ψ), by structurality of i , we get that Γ ω i ψ, since Γ ⊆ Γ ω and unsk γ (skel Σi (ψ)) = ψ. Given that ψ ∈ sub(Γ) we conclude, using the fixed point characterization of Definition 3.5 and
The previous lemma shows, in particular, that x * is essentially redundant whenever Γ = ∅. In the next proposition we state our fundamental characterization of mixed reasoning in logics resulting from disjoint fibring, as already hinted by Example 3.1. Under the disjointness assumption, the result completely characterizes the behavior of a fibred logic based on the behavior of the logics being combined. We delay its proof to the Appendix, in the end of the paper, so that the focus on decidability is not lost.
be logics such that Σ 1 ∩ Σ 2 = ∅, and consider Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L Σ12 (P ), as well as i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i = j. Then,
Let us revisit Example 3.1 at the light of Proposition 3.8, for the sake of illustration.
Example 3.9. Regarding Example 3.1, with Γ = {¬¬¬(p ∧ p)} and ψ = ¬p, the following equalities hold. Symetrically, we could also argue that:
In order to emphasize how Proposition 3.8 depends in an essential way on the disjointness assumption, it is worth revisiting the tonk example. Example 3.10. As we have seen in Example 3.2, we have that
is a fibred logic, one could be tempted to justify this fact using Proposition 3.8. As p and q have no strict subformulas (and even less monoliths, as Σ tonk(intr) = Σ tonk(elim) ), we have
and it is easy to check that {p, x * } tonk(intr) q and also that {p, x * } is not tonk(elim) -explosive; or mutatis mutandis, that {p, x * } tonk(elim) q and also that {p, x * } is not tonk(intr) -explosive.
Decidability and complexity
In this section we present and prove the main results of this paper. First, we prove decidability preservation for disjoint fibring, and analyze the complexity of the corresponding algorithms. Then, we also obtain a decidability reflection result which, excluding pathological cases, will allow us to conclude that L 1 • L 2 is decidable if and only if both L 1 and L 2 are decidable, whenever the fibring is disjoint.
In order to compute monoliths and skeletons of formulas of L 1 • L 2 , we further assume that the signatures Σ 1 , Σ 2 are decidable.
Deciding fibred logics
We say that decidability is preserved by fibring if L 1 • L 2 is decidable whenever both L 1 and L 2 are decidable. Reciprocally, we say that decidability is reflected by fibring if L 1 • L 2 decidable implies that L 1 and L 2 are both decidable.
It turns out that, in general, decidability is not preserved nor reflected by fibring, as the following examples illustrate.
Example 4.1. For the sake of illustration, let us consider the logics introduced by the following, more or less standard, Hilbert calculi:
• H imp = Σ imp , R imp , where Σ imp has a unique 2-place connective →, and R imp has the rules
• H botimp = Σ botimp , R botimp , where Σ botimp equals Σ imp plus a 0-place connective ⊥, and R botimp contains the unique rule
Clearly, the system H imp induces the logic of classical implication L imp , whereas L cls = L imp • L botimp corresponds to full propositional classical logic, where other classical connectives can be obtained, as usual, by abbreviation, e.g., ¬ϕ ϕ → ⊥.
It is also useful to consider modal logics:
• H 2 = Σ 2 , R 2 , where Σ 2 has a unique 1-place connective 2, and R 2 contains the rule p 2p .
• H k2 = Σ k2 , R k2 , where Σ k2 = Σ cls ∪ Σ 2 , and R k2 contains just the k 2 axiom 2p → 22p ,
, where Σ K2 = Σ k2 , and R K2 contains R cls ∪ R 2 ∪ R k2 plus the rule
The system H 2 is simply the 2-syntactical fragment of the smallest normal modal logic K 2 , which is induced precisely by the system H K2 . As usual, we shall use the abbreviation 3ϕ ¬2¬ϕ.
Other modal and multi-modal axioms are also in hand:
• H 42 = Σ 42 , R 42 , where Σ 42 = Σ k2 , and R 42 contains just the 4 2 axiom 2p → 22p ,
, where Σ tb2 = Σ k2 , and R tb2 includes just the t 2 and b 2 axioms
, and R ccr2 1 ,2 2 includes just the commutativity and Church-Rosser axioms , and L CCR2 1 ,2 2 is also straightforwardly decidable as it is defined by just two axiom schemata. Example 4.3. Perhaps more surprising, is the fact that decidability is, in general, also not reflected by fibring. A simple counterexample consists of taking any undecidable logic U and any trivial logic T . Obviously, T is decidable. It is a simple fact that U • T is also trivial, and therefore also decidable, despite the fact that the component logic U is undecidable.
A more interesting counterexample, where both component logics are undecidable but still their fibring is decidable, can be obtained by considering any two undecidable logics U 1 and U 2 whose signatures do not contain the tonk 1-place connective, and taking the fibring (
It is easy to see that the component logics U 1 • L tonk(intr) and U 2 • L tonk(elim) are both still undecidable, but their fibring is decidable, as ( [35, 20] to be decidable.
Despite the difficulties illustrated above, the panorama with respect to the preservation and reflection of decidability is quite distinct when one restricts attention to disjoint fibring.
Decidability preservation for disjoint fibring
Our goal here is to show that disjoint fibring always preserves decidability. The essential idea is to take advantage of Proposition 3.8. In order to decide whether Γ 12 ψ, in a logic obtained by disjoint fibring, the idea is to pick i ∈ {1, 2} (it makes sense to choose i such that head(ψ) ∈ Σ i ) and check, equivalently, whether
Proof. The result follows easily from the fact that | sub(Γ)| ≤ ω by observing that, for all n ∈ N 0 , Γ n+1 \ Γ n ⊆ sub(Γ), and also that if Γ n+1 = Γ n then Γ n = Γ ω . Lemma 4.4 tells us that the number of iterations needed to compute Γ ω is bounded by the cardinality of the set sub(Γ), being of course finite when Γ is finite. Furthermore, the result justifies the ω bound in the definition, since we are assuming that we are dealing with denumerable languages. It is important to note that computing Γ ω requires listing all the subformulas of formulas in Γ, which we can do, since the signatures are decidable, whenever Γ is finite.
Finally, our decidability preservation result can be presented. It uses an inductive argument that will allow us to compute X i Γ (ψ). Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume without loss of generality that p 0 / ∈ var(Γ). This assumption is easily justified by Lemma 2.1, since we could decide equivalently whether Γ Let L 1 be decidable with decision algorithm D 1 , and L 2 be decidable with decision algorithm D 2 . First, we consider the subroutine S that calculates Γ ω defined in Figure 1 . As stated in Lemma 4.4 the recursion in S has at most | sub(Γ)| steps, which is bounded by size(Γ), and therefore converges always to Γ ω , as Γ is assumed to be finite. Figure 1 : Saturation subroutine S to compute S(Γ) = Γ ω . Now, we can already consider deciding the fibred logic in the case when at least one of the component logics, L 1 or L 2 , has theorems. Under such an assumption, the decision algorithm D for the fibred logic is defined in Figure 2 .
Assuming that at least one of the component logics, L 1 or L 2 , has theorems, we now show that for all finite Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L Σ12 (P ), D(Γ)(ψ) terminates, and
As we said above, we know that S converges always to Γ ω in at most size(Γ) steps. Furthermore, as at least one of the component logics has theorems, we know that x * ∈ Γ 1 and x * ∈ Γ 2 . Hence, the lines Γ 1 ← skel Σ1 (Γ ω ) ∪ {x * } and Γ 2 ← skel Σ2 (Γ ω ) ∪ {x * } correctly set the values of Γ 1 and Γ 2 , following Definition 3.5.
If either
as a consequence of the assumption that p 0 / ∈ var(Γ), we can conclude that Γ 1 is 1 -explosive or Γ 2 is 2 -explosive, which in any case implies that Γ is 12 -explosive. Hence Γ 12 ψ for all ψ ∈ L Σ12 (P ), which justifies the fact that the output algorithm D(Γ) = D yes always returns yes.
If neither of the
We show, by induction on the structure of ψ ∈ L Σ12 (P ), that D(Γ 1 , Γ 2 )(ψ) terminates and outputs
For the induction base, let For the induction step, let ψ = c(ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) for some n-place connective c = head(ψ) ∈ Σ 12 . Clearly i = 1 if c ∈ Σ 1 , and i = 2 if c ∈ Σ 2 . Moreover, M = Mon Σi (ψ) = n j=1 Mon Σi (ψ j ). By induction hypothesis, for each φ ∈ M , D(Γ 1 , Γ 2 )(φ) terminates and answers yes precisely if Γ 12 φ and so, easily,
Since L i is decidable with D i , the algorithm terminates. As Γ 3−i is assumed not to be 3−i -explosive, Proposition 3.8 guarantees that the answer is yes if Γ 12 ψ, and no if otherwise.
When none of the component logics L 1 and L 2 has theorems, we need the slightly more involved algorithm D' described in Figure 3 .
When none of L 1 , L 2 has theorems, D'(Γ) first checks whether Γ = ∅. If that is the case, then it is immediate that L 1 • L 2 also has no theorems and therefore Γ 12 ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ L Σ12 (P ), which justifies the fact that the output algorithm is D'(Γ) = D no always returns no. If Γ = ∅ then x * ∈ Γ 1 and x * ∈ Γ 2 , and clearly D(Γ) decides L 1 • L 2 , using the same line of argument as above. Overall, when none of the component logics has theorems, for all finite Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L Σ12 (P ), D'(Γ)(ψ) terminates, and
as we wanted to prove.
It is useful to have a look at a few application examples.
Example 4.6. Let us recover the logic L neg • L cnj = Σ neg ∪ Σ cnj , introduced in Example 3.1, and run the decision algorithm on the formulas in Examples 3.1 and 3.9. Since L neg • L cnj has no theorems we shall be using D'.
• Let Γ = {¬¬(p ∧ (¬¬q))} and ψ = q ∧ (¬¬p). We know that Γ ψ.
We call D'(Γ)(ψ). The first step of D'(Γ) is to check whether Γ = ∅, which clearly is not the case. Hence, we proceed as D(Γ)(ψ). In turn D(Γ), calls S(Γ) and assigns its output to Γ ω . S(Γ) starts by listing all the subformulas of Γ, sub(Γ) = {¬¬(p ∧ (¬¬q)), ¬(p ∧ (¬¬q)), p ∧ (¬¬q), p, ¬¬q, ¬q, q}. Then, the algorithm recursively saturates Γ, obtaining Γ k in run k, until it reaches a fixed point. In this case, we have:
-Γ 2 = Γ 1 ∪ {p, ¬¬q}, since Γ 1 cnj p and Γ 1 cnj ¬¬q;
After computing Γ ω = {¬¬(p ∧ (¬¬q)), p ∧ (¬¬q), p, ¬¬q, q}, D(Γ) applies skel Σneg and skel Σ cnj to obtain Γ cnj , Γ neg . At this point, we have -Γ neg = {¬¬x p∧(¬¬q) , x p∧(¬¬q) , p, ¬¬q, q, x * }, and
Next, D(Γ) checks if either Γ neg neg p 0 or Γ cnj cnj p 0 , which is clearly not the case. As a result, one now needs to compute D(Γ cnj , Γ neg )(ψ). After checking that head(ψ) = ∧ ∈ Σ cnj , the algorithm picks i = cnj and sets M = Mon Σ cnj (ψ) = {¬¬p}. In order to calculate χ, the algorithm then recursively calls D(Γ cnj , Γ neg )(φ) to each φ ∈ M , that is, to φ = ¬¬p.
-Locally, on the run of D(Γ cnj , Γ neg )(¬¬p), after checking that ¬ / ∈ Σ cnj , the algorithm picks i = neg and sets M = Mon Σneg (¬¬p) = ∅. As a consequence, χ = ∅ and the algorithm tests whether Γ neg neg skel Σneg (¬¬p). As skel Σneg (¬¬p) = ¬¬p and p ∈ Γ neg the algorithm returns yes.
Returning to the main algorithm, we get χ = {x ¬¬p } and finally test whether Γ cnj ∪χ cnj skel Σ cnj (ψ). As skel Σ cnj (ψ) = q ∧ x ¬¬p , q ∈ Γ cnj and x ¬¬p ∈ χ, the algorithm returns yes.
• Γ = {¬¬¬(p ∧ p)} and ψ = ¬p. We know that ¬¬¬(p ∧ p) ¬p.
We call D'(Γ)(ψ). The first step of D'(Γ) is to check whether Γ = ∅, which clearly is not the case. Hence, we proceed as D(Γ)(ψ). In turn D(Γ), calls S(Γ) to compute Γ ω . As calculated in Example 3.9, Γ ω = {¬¬¬(p ∧ p), ¬(p ∧ p), x * }. Afterwards, D(Γ) applies skel Σneg and skel Σ cnj to obtain Γ cnj , Γ neg . At this point, as obtained in Example 3.9, we have -Γ neg = {¬¬¬x p∧p , ¬x p∧p , x * }, and
Next, D(Γ) checks if either Γ neg neg p 0 or Γ cnj cnj p 0 , which is again not the case. As a result, one now needs to compute D(Γ cnj , Γ neg )(ψ). After checking that head(ψ) = ∧ / ∈ Σ cnj , the algorithm picks i = neg and sets M = Mon Σneg (ψ) = ∅. As a consequence, we get χ = ∅ and finally test whether Γ neg neg skel Σneg (ψ). We have that skel Σneg (ψ) = ψ = ¬p, and it is not hard to see that the algorithm returns no as Γ neg neg ¬p.
Complexity
Having shown above that disjoint fibring preserves decidability, it is worth analyzing the complexity of the decision algorithms obtained. For the sake of simplicity, we shall further assume that the signatures Σ 1 , Σ 2 of the component logics are not only decidable, but decidable in constant time O(1). This assumption fits perfectly with the cases when the signatures are finite, as in all the examples we analyze. A thorougher analysis, including possibly non-constant decision procedures for membership in Σ 1 , Σ 2 is of course possible, but would lead to dealing with additional terms involving their running time functions.
If logic L 1 is decidable in time bounded by f 1 (m, n) and logic L 2 is decidable in time bounded by
We analyze the running time of different parts of the algorithms 1 .
(a) For a given finite Γ ∪ {ψ} ∈ L Σ12 (P ), depending on whether at least one of the component logics L 1 , L 2 has theorems or not, we must consider algorithm D or algorithm D , from the proof of Proposition 4.5. However, algorithm D just checks, in one go, if Γ = ∅, and then, in the worst case, proceeds as D.
(b) Then, independently of ψ, algorithm D uses the subroutine S to compute S(Γ) = Γ ω . For that purpose, it must list all the subformulas of formulas in Γ, taking O(size(Γ)) = O(m) steps, and then run the recursion coded in S. In each recursive round k, it calls D 1 (Γ k−1 )(ϕ) and D 2 (Γ k−1 )(ϕ) for each ϕ ∈ sub(Γ), calculating Γ k , until it gets to a fixed-point. We know from Lemma 4.4, that the recursion needs at most | sub(Γ)| ≤ m rounds, and so the number of calls to each D 1 , D 2 is bounded by m 2 . Of course, size(ϕ) ≤ m for each ϕ ∈ sub(Γ), and it is not hard to see that for
(c) In order to calculate Γ 1 and Γ 2 , the algorithm applies skel Σi to every formula in Γ ω . For each formula in Γ ω , this operation takes at most as many steps as the size of the formula. In total, it takes time O(m 2 ). There are two additional steps to add x * to each of the resulting sets. Note that 2m 2 + 2 = 2(m 2 + 1), and m 2 + 1 is precisely an upper-bound for the size of both Γ 1 and Γ 2 . Then, the algorithm calls
. If any of the calls returns yes it stops.
(d) However, in the worst case, both calls will return no, and the algorithm will further call D(
Hence, in the worst case scenario, and collecting the contributions of each of the four phases discriminated above, we have that
We now prove, by induction,
. Just note that under our assumption of constant time for deciding membership in the component signatures, checking whether head(ψ) ∈ Σ 2 and calculating M = Mon Σi (ψ) will take time bounded by O(1) + O(size(ψ)).
For the induction base, let n = 1. If size(ψ) = n = 1 then either ψ = p ∈ P or ψ = c ∈ Σ (0) i for some i ∈ {1, 2}. When ψ = p ∈ P , the algorithm sets i = 1. Then, in both cases, the algorithm gets M = Mon Σi (ψ) = ∅, and computes skel Σi (ψ) = ψ. Hence, we need only consider the running time of
, that is,
For the induction step, let n > 1. If size(ψ) = n then ψ = c(ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k ) for some k-place connective c = head(ϕ) ∈ Σ 1 ∪ Σ 2 and size(ψ 1 ) + · · · + size(ψ k ) = n − 1. Note that D(Γ 1 , Γ 2 )(ψ) sets i = 1 if c ∈ Σ 1 and i = 2 if c ∈ Σ 2 . Note also that size(M ) ≤ n and size(skel Σi (ψ)) ≤ n. Further, it follows that n φ = size(φ) ≤ n for every φ ∈ M = Mon Σi (ψ), and size(
As we have to consider the running times of all D(Γ 1 , Γ 2 )(φ), for φ ∈ M , and also of D i (Γ i ∪ χ)(skel Σi (ψ)), using the induction hypothesis, the total running time of
Concluding the argument, we have that
Additionally, just note that if p 0 ∈ var(Γ), our complexity expression must be added an additional linear term corresponding to the calculation of Γ nxt and ψ nxt , as explained above. Of course, this linear term does not change the upper-bound obtained.
The complexity upper-bound obtained above shows that the decision problem for the fibred logic reduces polynomially to the worst decision problem of the given logics. In particular, if the decision problems for L 1 and L 2 are both in the complexity class C then the decision problem for L 1 • L 2 is also in C, for any class C that contains P and is closed for composition with polynomials, such as the common classes P, NP, coNP, PSPACE, EXPTIME, and so on.
Example 4.8. Consider the unconstrained fibring L cnj • L neg that we have used in Examples 3.1, 3.3, 3.9 and 4.6. It is clear that L cnj is decidable in quadratic time (its decision procedure boils down to set inclusion), and that L neg is decidable in linear time. As a direct application of Propositions 4.5 and 4.7, we can conclude that L cnj • L neg is also decidable, in polynomial time, with a time bound polynomial of degree four. We already knew from Examples 3.1 and 4.6 that L cnj • L neg does not coincide with classical logic, but we can anyway confirm it is the case if we assume the usual conjecture P = NP, since the decision problem for classical logic is known to be in coNP.
As another application of Propositions 4.5 and 4.7, let us consider the unconstrained fibring L imp •L neg . As the decision problem for L imp is known to be in coNP, we can conclude that L imp •L neg is also decidable and its decision problem in coNP. Note, however, that L imp • L neg is still strictly weaker than classical logic, which can be shown with the aid of Proposition 3.8. 
Decidability reflection for disjoint fibring
We now show that disjoint fibring also reflects decidability, in all but trivial pathological cases. Proof. Our proof relies in an essential way on the notion of conservative extension, as defined in Subsection 2.2.
Let us assume that L 1 • L 2 is decidable and none of the component logics Situation (a) cannot be the case, as one of the component logics would have to be trivial, contradicting our assumption. We are thus left with the situation (b). We assume, without loss of generality that i = 1, i.e., L 1 • L 2 does not extend conservatively L 1 precisely because L 1 has q-theorems and L 2 has theorems. In this case, we claim that algorithm A 1 described in Figure 4 decides L 1 , where
We need to show that for all finite Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L Σ1 (P ), A 1 (Γ)(ψ) terminates, and
Termination of the algorithm, in all cases, is straightforward, as we assume that algorithm A decides the fibred logic.
If Γ = ∅ then A 1 (Γ)(ψ) always outputs no. In fact, as we know that L 1 has q-theorems it easily follows that L 1 does not have theorems, and thus 1 ψ.
is yes if and only if Γ 12 ψ. Using Proposition 3.8,
, and thus x * ∈ Γ 2 ⊆ X * ∪ P . As Γ is finite, it is obvious that Γ 2 is also finite, and we can pick a variable q / ∈ Γ 2 . If Γ 2 would be 2 -explosive, we would have Γ 2 2 q and therefore also p 2 q, by using the structurally of 2 , which would contradict the assumption that L 2 is not trivial.
Furthermore, as ψ ∈ L Σ1 (P ), it follows that X 1 Γ (ψ) = ∅ and skel Σ1 (ψ) = ψ. Moreover, as we already saw that Γ ω ⊆ L Σ1 (P ) it also follows that Γ 1 = Γ ω . Hence, we have that A 1 (Γ)(ψ) outputs yes if and only if Γ ω 1 ψ. As Γ ⊆ Γ ω , in order to close the proof, we just need to show that Γ ω ⊆ Γ 1 . We use an inductive argument on the construction of Γ ω . For the base case, it is clear that Γ 0 = Γ ⊆ Γ 1 . For the induction step, let us assume that Γ n ⊆ Γ 1 and ϕ ∈ Γ n+1 \ Γ n . If Γ n 1 ϕ then it is obvious that ϕ ∈ Γ 1 . We just need to see that the alternative case, when Γ n 2 ϕ, cannot happen. If it did, as ϕ ∈ sub(Γ), it would follow that also ϕ ∈ L Σ1 (P ). Therefore, the Σ 2 -skeletons of not only the formulas in Γ n , but also of ϕ, would be variables. Moreover, as different formulas have different skeletons, it would also be the case that skel Σ2 (ϕ) / ∈ skel Σ2 (Γ n ). Finally, using Proposition A.3, we would be able to conclude that Γ n 2 ϕ is equivalent to skel Σ2 (Γ n ) 2 skel Σ2 (ϕ), and would once again contradict the assumption that L 2 is not trivial, using the same argument as above.
We can now strengthen Proposition 4.9, using the decidability preservation result from Proposition 4.5, into the following corollary. 
Conclusion
We have studied in detail the decision problem for fibred logics, and shown that decidability is preserved and (almost) reflected by disjoint fibring. The results we obtained extend the preliminary results of [28] about deciding theoremhood, and are the first of their kind, thus opening the way to formal tool support for fibred logics in a neat and modular way. Although distinct in nature, it is worth mentioning that our decision algorithms bear some similarities with the Nelson-Oppen approach to deciding joint equational theories [30] .
Owing to their importance, a special word is due with respect to the complexity results obtained. Indeed, we have proved that, in the disjoint case, the complexity of the decision problem we obtain for the fibred logic is only slightly worse than the complexity of the hardest component logic, the slow-down being polynomial. The result thus entails that complexity in fibred logics is necessarily a by-product of sharing connectives and, as a consequence, that the complexity of an arbitrary logic can be ultimately broken down to the complexity of its connectives in isolation, and the complexity of its mixed axioms and rules (pertaining to more than one connective).
In practice, it is common and useful to study also the satisfiability problem (SAT) for a given logic L = Σ, , usually presented as a semantical notion: given a formula ϕ ∈ L Σ (P ) is there a model for L satisfying it? Our development here is completely independent of semantics, but it is a well known fact (e.g., [39] ) that, for Tarskian logics such as the ones we consider, logical matrices do provide a suitable notion of model. Furthermore, as a consequence, it is straightfoward to check that a formula ϕ is thus satisfiable (in some matrix model of L) if and only if ϕ is not -explosive, or equivalently, if ϕ p 0 for some variable p 0 / ∈ var(ϕ). Hence, if L is decidable then so is its SAT problem. The converse is in general not true, as Example 5.1 illustrates. Thus, the preservation of SAT by disjoint fibring (and fibring in general) remains an open problem, except for the cases where the component logics do not only have a decidable SAT problem but are themselves decidable.
Example 5.1. Let M denote the set of all Turing machines, and η : N 0 → M be an enumeration of M. Consider the logic L halt defined by the Hilbert calculus
• H halt = Σ halt , R halt , where Σ halt has the 0-place connective all, and the 1-place connective halt, and R halt has the rules
where halt 0 (ϕ) = ϕ and halt
The SAT problem for L halt is trivial, as no formula explodes (every formula is satisfiable), but the decidability problem for L halt is obviously undecidable.
The decidability and complexity results we obtained depend, in a fundamental way, of the key result of Proposition 3.8, which fully characterizes disjoint fibring in terms of its component logics, and that generalizes the partial characterization results obtained in [28, 27] . Although this result was intentionally secondarized in the exposition, in order to keep the focus on decidability, it is a very rich tool whose range of applicability goes well beyond. For instance, in [27] , a weaker form of Proposition 3.8 was used to study the conservativity problem for fibred logics, and also to show that fibring does not preserve finite-valuedness. We expect the result to be useful in further studies of fibring, including a deeper and much needed understanding of its semantics. Besides fibring, the result of Proposition 3.8 can be understood as one of the rare meaningful results about the proof-theory of Hilbert calculi.
There are several lines of future work that we would like to follow. An obvious research direction is to pursue a version of Proposition 3.8 that could allow us to tackle non-disjoint fibring. Of course, we cannot expect to obtain a general (effective) description of mixed patterns of reasoning, such as the one obtained here for disjoint fibring, as we know and have shown that decidability is not always preserved by fibring. Moreover, such a generalization seems to need new insights to deal with shared connectives in an appropriate way, but would certainly provide us with a much deeper understanding of the fibring mechanism, and could potentially have a myriad of practical applications. There is some hope, however, in obtaining partial results of this kind that may be applicable to particular forms of fibring with sufficiently well-behaved shared connectives. We are currently investigating this possibility, namely by exploring the lessons learnt with fusions of modal logics and all the interesting results known about them [20] , where a basic classical logic is shared. In a wider perspective, it also worth investigating the relationship between our goals and recent work aimed at building, using syntactic criteria, proof-calculi for suitably well behaved logics [12, 11, 14, 24] .
Another possibility we are considering, is to try and generalize our decidability results to a wider range of fibred logics. Of course, effective generalizations of Proposition 3.8 as discussed in the previous paragraph, would necessarily entail more general decidability results. However, we can also attack the decidability problem more directly. An idea would be to explore situations where the fibred logic is a conservative extension of its components, which could lead to decidability preservation under the proviso of obtaining suitable translations from each of the component logics to their shared fragment.
Our result has also potential applications beyond disjoint fibring. Suppose that a certain logic L = Σ, can be split into disjoint fragments L 1 and L 2 , plus a finite number of interaction axioms. Then, we have that Γ ϕ if and only if Γ, Ax 12 ϕ, where Ax contains all instances of the interaction axioms. Now, this is still not enough to decide the logic L, in general, even if L 1 and L 2 are both decidable, as the set Ax is typically infinite. However, it may happen that for each finite Γ and ϕ there exists a finite A Γ,ϕ ⊆ Ax such that Γ, Ax 12 ϕ if and only if Γ, A Γ,ϕ 12 ϕ, e.g., when the logics are finitary. If the set A Γ,ϕ happens to be computable, then we are able to recover the decidability of L. Furthermore, we can still evaluate the complexity of the decision problem for L on the basis of the complexity of computing A Γ,ϕ in each case. Note also that, taking into account our complexity results, when we know the complexity of the logic L we may be able to draw interesting conclusions about the size and complexity of computing A Γ,ϕ , or even about the complexity of the fragments L 1 and L 2 .
Take, for instance, classical logic L cls , and consider its fragment L bot as defined in Example 5.2. It is easy to see that L cls = L imp • L bot • L botimp , and thus Γ cls ϕ is equivalent to Γ, Ax 12 ϕ if we take
Even better, using the results available for propositional classical logic, it is not hard to check that Γ cls ϕ if and only if Γ, A Γ,ϕ 12 ϕ where A Γ,ϕ = {⊥ → ϕ}. Note that, in this case, A Γ,ϕ is computable in linear time from ϕ. This observation, together with our complexity result, allows us to have an alternative view on the interplay between the complexities of the fragments of classical logic involved. Namely, knowing that the complexity of deciding L bot is linear, and that the problem of deciding L cls is coNP-complete, we immediately obtain that deciding L imp must also be coNP-complete (a result that is well known, of course, but of which we just obtain an alternative simple proof). We look forward to analyze, in the future, further (more interesting) instances of this phenomenon, and moreover explore its possible connections with the finite model property. Easily, L bot is the logic of classical (or intuitionistic) bottom (falsum).
Last but not least, refining the idea above, a particularly appealing application of our results seems to be in approximate reasoning in the sense used also in [23, 15] . In the scenario above, even when for each Γ and ϕ there is a finite A Γ,ϕ ⊆ Ax such that Γ, Ax 12 ϕ if and only if Γ, A Γ,ϕ 12 ϕ, it will often be the case that this set A Γ,ϕ is too big, or not effectively/efficiently calculable. In general, it will not be an easy task to characterize such a set A Γ,ϕ , but knowing the complexity of the logics involved may help us graft some of its properties, as our results allow us to set a lower bound on the complexity of computing A Γ,ϕ . Moreover, even if A Γ,ϕ is not computable or too hard to compute, it is still reasonable to look for efficient approximations of the set. Hence, if we manage to come up with a strictly increasing sequence of efficiently computable sets A
A Γ,ϕ , one may end up with a sequence of workable approximations of the resulting logic by considering whether Γ, A i Γ,ϕ 12 ϕ for i ∈ N 0 , under complexity bounds that are completely determined by our results. Such approximations seem to be very much specific of each logic we consider, but could definitely have a big impact on practical applications.
As an illustration, let us consider propositional normal modal logic suitably decomposed as
It is well known that the problem of deciding K 2 is PSPACE-complete. Moreover, deciding L cls is coNP-complete, whereas it is not difficult to conclude that the decision problem for L 2 is polynomial. Hence, assuming that NP =PSPACE (and therefore coNP =PSPACE), our complexity results allow us to conclude that there cannot be a polynomial time algorithm to compute a suitable set A Γ,ϕ ⊆ {2(ϕ → ψ) → (2ϕ → 2ψ) : ϕ, ψ ∈ L Σ K2 (P )}. Still, it would be specially interesting to look for efficient approximating sequences {A i Γ,ϕ } i∈N0 to A Γ,ϕ in the spirit of [29, 32] . 
A Appendix
In this appendix, which should actually be seen as an additional section of the paper, we present the details of the result on which our decidability and complexity results depend. We emphasise that this appendix should not be understood as a mere technical annex, not because it is not relatively involved in technical terms, which it is, but because it presents a fundamental result which is important per se: our final aim is to obtain a proof of the full characterization result of disjoint fibring with respect to the component logics presented in Proposition 3.8.
A.1 Monoliths and substitutions
It is useful to consider forms of replacement of formulas by formulas. Let Σ ∪ Σ be signatures. Given two η-sequences α and β of L Σ (P ) formulas, with α injective, we write ψ[α/β] Σ to denote the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of α i as a Σ-monolith of ψ by β i , for all i < η. We dub this notion as shallow monolithic-substitution. It is not difficult to check
σ where σ is a substitution σ : P ∪ X → L Σ (P ) such that σ(x αi ) = β i for all i < η and σ(y) = y for y ∈ P ∪ (X \ {x αi : i < η}). We extend the notation to sets, or sequences, of formulas ψ in the natural way.
Clearly, the notion of substitution that we have just defined is useful in the context of fibring, whenever we consider two signatures Σ 1 and Σ 2 such that Σ ∈ {Σ 1 , Σ 2 } and Σ = Σ 1 ∪ Σ 2 . When we further work in the context of disjoint fibring, i.e., when Σ 1 ∩ Σ 2 = ∅, the following more complex notion of replacement is also useful.
Given ψ, α, β ∈ L Σ12 (P ) such that head(α) ∈ Σ i for i ∈ {1, 2}, we write ψ{α/β} Σ1,Σ2 to denote the deep monolithic-substitution of the formula α by β in ψ, obtained by replacing by β any occurrence of α as a Σ 3−i -monolith of a subformula of ψ whose head is not in Σ i . Formally:
We shall write ψ{α/β} instead of ψ{α/β} Σ1,Σ2 , for simplicity, whenever the signatures Σ 1 and Σ 2 are clear in the context. The curly bracket substitution notations for deep monolithic-substitution is also extended to sets, or sequences, of formulas in the obvious manner.
Though involved, specially the notion of deep substitution, these notions are quite simple to use, as illustrated by the following example.
Example A.1. For a change, let us consider Σ neg and Σ imp , as defined in Examples 3.1 and 4.1.
If we take
In order to understand why, it is useful to analyze each of the three occurrences of ¬p in ψ. The leftmost occurrence of ¬p is a Σ imp -monolith of ψ and is thus replaced in both the shallow and deep substitutions. The second occurrence of ¬p is strictly inside another Σ imp -monolith, that is, ¬(q → ¬p). Thus, it is not touched by the shallow substitution. However, ¬p is a Σ imp -monolith of the subformula q → ¬p inside, and is therefore replaced by the deep substitution. Finally, the third and rightmost occurrence of ¬p is strictly inside the Σ imp -monolith ¬¬p. However, ¬p is never a Σ imp -monolith of a subformula of ¬¬p whose head is not ¬ (there is no such subformula), and thus both the shallow and the deep substitution leave the rightmost ¬p untouched.
Next, we borrow a very useful lemma from [28] . We include its proof, for the sake of self-containment, but also because it is small but may help the reader to understand what is happening, and hopefully work as a warm up for what comes next.
Lemma A.2. Let Σ ⊆ Σ and Γ ⊆ L Σ (P ). Then, for every σ : P → L Σ (P ), and every two η-sequences α and β of formulas in L Σ (P ), with α injective, there exists ρ : P → L Σ (P ) such that
Proof. One should observe, to start with, that Mon Σ (Γ) = ∅. Thus, if α κ ∈ Mon Σ (ϕ σ ) for some ϕ ∈ Γ, then there must exist a variable p ∈ P occurring in ϕ such that α κ ∈ Mon Σ (σ(p)). Hence, the substitution defined by ρ(q) = σ(q)[α/β] Σ for every q ∈ P satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
Note that the lemma reflects the fact that the occurrence of Σ-monoliths in instances of L Σ (P ) formulas is only possible if they are brought about by the substitution. As a corollary, we obtain the following result.
. Then, the following properties hold:
• ∆ ϕ if and only if skel Σ (∆) skel Σ (ϕ), and
• ∆ is -explosive if and only if skel Σ (∆) is -explosive.
Proof. We prove each of the properties.
• If ∆ ϕ then, by definition, there exist Γ∪{ψ} ⊆ L Σ (P ) and σ : P → L Σ (P ) such that Γ ψ, Γ σ = ∆ and ψ σ = ϕ. Let a = Mon Σ (∆ ∪ {ϕ}) be any injective and surjective sequence based on Mon Σ (∆ ∪ {ϕ}), and define β to be the same length sequence such that each β ι = x αι . Note that ϕ [α/β] Σ = skel Σ (ϕ ) for every ϕ ∈ ∆ ∪ {ϕ}. The left-to-right implication follows simply by applying Lemma A.2 to Γ ∪ {ψ}, α and β, and then the structurality of under the resulting substitution ρ.
Conversely, the fact that skel Σ (∆) skel Σ (ϕ) implies ∆ ϕ follows easily from the structurality of by considering the substitution unsk as defined in Lemma 3.4.
• If ∆ is -explosive then we know that ∆ nxt p 0 . Using the first property, already proved above, we get that skel Σ (∆ nxt ) p 0 . Consider the substitution ρ : P ∪ X → L Σ (P ∪ X) such that ρ(p) = p if p ∈ P , ρ(x φ ) = x φ prv , with prv defined as in the proof of Lemma 2.1. Easily, we have
nxt , and by structurality we conclude that skel Σ (∆)
Reciprocally, assume that skel Σ (∆) is -explosive, and consider again the substitution unsk. Of course, skel Σ (∆) unsk is also -explosive, and it follows from Lemma 3.4 that skel Σ (∆) unsk = ∆.
The next lemma plays, for deep monolithic-substitution, the same role played by Lemma A.2 for shallow substitution.
σ {α/β}, as we wanted to prove.
A.2 The interplay between the components in disjoint fibring
Let us now have a technical look at the patterns of mixed reasoning that occur in fibred logics, formalizing the ideas in Example 3.1. We proceed by characterizing the irrelevance of certain monoliths in derivations in logics obtained by disjoint fibring, by taking advantage of the deep monolithic-substitutions introduced above. Note that the disjointness of the signatures is instrumental for this purpose. Before stating and proving the result, let us analyze a few concrete cases.
and β ∈ L Σ (P ), and consider the following four 9-sequences.
It is straightforward to check that Γ ψ, in the leftmost column of the table. The other three sequences are the result of applying monolithic substitutions to ψ. These sequences illustrate how deep monolithic substitution provides the adequate notion to express the irrelevance of certain monoliths in a derivation. Moreover, they suggest a criterion for the (ir)relevance of a certain monolith.
It is not hard to see that if we use deep monolithic substitutions to replace all the monolithic occurrences of ¬t with any other formula β, we still obtain a proof in L imp • L neg from Γ{¬t/β}. That is, Γ{¬t/β} ψ{¬t/β}.
The fact that Γ[¬t/β] Σ imp ψ[¬t/β] Σ imp highlights the difference between deep and shallow monolithic substitutions. The point is that shallow substitution fails to reach the monoliths inside other monoliths, as is the case of ¬t in ¬¬(¬q → (p → ¬t)) at the last step of ψ[¬t/β] Σ imp .
However, it may happen that deep substitutions also fail to preserve the derivation. This is illustrated in the last column of the table above, by taking the Σ imp -monolith ¬p and β = r ∈ P . Clearly, Γ{¬p/r} ψ{¬p/r} as the formula r at step 3 of the sequence is neither an hypothesis nor can it be justified by a rule applied to the previous formulas.
We may now say that the Σ imp -monoliths ¬t and ¬p have different roles and relevance in the derivation Γ ψ. If a formula appears in a derivation, as is the case of ¬p = ψ 3 , we cannot hope, in general, to be able to replace its occurrences by a given formula. However, as we shall see below, the fact that a monolith does not appear in a derivation, such as in the case of ¬t in ψ, will be enough to ensure that it can be deep monolithically substituted by any formula.
For the remainder of this appendix, we assume fixed two logics L 1 = Σ 1 , 1 and L 2 = Σ 2 , 2 such that Σ 1 ∩ Σ 2 = ∅. We let also H L1 • H L2 = Σ 12 , 12 .
The next lemma, whose content is illustrated by Example A.5, extends similar partial results about shallow substitution and disjoint fibring, but concerning only Γ ⊆ P as obtained in [28] , or Γ ⊆ L Σ1 (P ) ∪ L Σ2 (P ) as obtained in [27] .
Lemma A.6. Let η be an ordinal, Γ ∪ {ψ κ : κ < η} ⊆ L Σ12 (P ) and ψ = ψ κ κ<η .
If Γ 12 ψ and α ∈ L Σ12 (P ), then we have that either
• α = ψ κ for some κ < η, or
• Γ{α/β} 12 ψ{α/β} for every β ∈ L Σ12 (P ).
Proof. Let us assume that α = ψ κ for every κ < η. The proof of the second condition follows by complete transfinite induction on the size η of the derivation. It suffices to assume, by induction hypothesis, that Γ{α/β} 12 ψ κ {α/β} κ<τ for every τ < η, and show that it implies Γ{α/β} 12 ψ κ {α/β} κ<η .
If η = 0 the result is trivial, as the derivation is empty. If η is a limit ordinal the result is immediate, by definition of derivation. If η is a successor ordinal, we have to consider two cases.
(1) ψ η−1 ∈ Γ.
If ψ η−1 ∈ Γ then ψ η−1 {α/β} ∈ Γ{α/β} and so the result follows.
By induction hypothesis we have that Γ{α/β} 12 ψ κ {α/β} κ<η−1 and so, by definition of derivation, we also have Γ{α/β} 12 ψ κ {α/β} κ<η .
(2) ψ η−1 = ϕ σ and ∆ σ ⊆ {ψ κ : κ < η − 1}, for some i ∈ {1, 2} and ∆ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L Σi (P ) such that ∆ i ϕ.
Since we are assuming that α / ∈ (∆ ∪ ϕ) σ , we can apply Lemma A.4 to ∆ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L Σi (P ), σ, α and β, and get that there exists ρ such that ϕ ρ = ϕ σ {α/β} = ψ η−1 {α/β}, and also ∆ ρ = ∆ σ {α/β} ⊆ {ψ κ {α/β} : κ < η − 1}.
The following lemma provides sufficient conditions for a consequence to hold in a logic obtained by disjoint fibring, which already amount to half of Proposition 3.8.
Lemma A.7. Let Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L Σ12 (P ). Given i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i = j,
Proof. Recall from Definition 3.5 that x * ∈ Γ i if and only if Γ 12 = ∅. Let σ be the substitution such that σ = unsk if Γ 12 = ∅, and otherwise σ = unsk γ with γ ∈ Γ 12 = ∅. Now, on one hand, if we have that Γ i , X i Γ (ψ) i skel Σi (ψ) then using structurality we obtain
and (skel Σi (ψ)) σ = ψ, by using Lemmas 3.4 and 3.7, and we conclude that Γ 12 ψ.
If, on the other hand, we know that Γ j is j -explosive, then we have Γ j j ψ. However, we also have (Γ j ) σ ⊆ Γ 12 and ψ σ = ψ, and we conclude again that Γ 12 ψ.
Before we state and prove Proposition 3.8, we need an additional lemma, which takes advantage of the fact that one can always work under the assumption that there is a fresh variable in P .
Lemma A.8. Given Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ L Σ12 (P ), let Θ = Γ nxt {ψ nxt /p 0 }. Then, (Θ ω ) prv ψ,id ⊆ Γ ω .
Proof. We prove, by induction on n ∈ N 0 , that (Θ n ) prv ψ,id ⊆ Γ n .
The base case is straightforward, as (Θ 0 ) prv ψ,id = Θ prv ψ,id = (Γ nxt {ψ nxt /p 0 }) prv ψ,id = Γ = Γ 0 , because prv ψ,id (p 0 ) = ψ, prv ψ,id (p k+1 ) = p k , and p 0 / ∈ var(Γ nxt ).
For the step, let ϕ ∈ Θ n and ϕ ∈ sub(Θ), and assume by induction hypothesis that (Θ n−1 ) prv ψ,id ⊆ Γ n−1 . Since ϕ ∈ Θ n , we know that Θ n−1 i ϕ for some i ∈ {1, 2}, and by structurality we get that (Θ n−1 ) prv ψ,id i ϕ prv ψ,id . Finally, monotonicity allows us to conclude that Γ n−1 i ϕ prv ψ,id and therefore ϕ prv ψ,id ∈ Γ n .
We can finally tackle the envisaged characterization result. It will be useful to consider the following additional substitutions: given Λ ⊆ L Σ12 (P ), let ast Λ : P ∪X * → L Σ12 (P ∪X * ) be such that ast Λ (x φ ) = x * if φ / ∈ Λ, and ast Λ (y) = y otherwise. It is straightforward to check that if Y ⊆ X then Y astΛ ⊆ {x * } ∪ {x φ ∈ Y : φ ∈ Λ}.
Proposition A.9. Let η be an ordinal, Γ ∪ {ψ κ : κ ≤ η} ⊆ L Σ12 (P ) and ψ = ψ κ κ≤η .
If Γ 12 ψ then the following properties hold:
-If condition (c) fails, then ψ η ∈ Γ ω . Consequently, skel Σi (ψ η ) ∈ Γ i , and therefore we also have Γ i , X i Γ (ψ, η) i skel Σi (ψ η ). (2) Assume that ψ η ∈ sub(Γ). As above, we will show that ψ η ∈ Γ ω by taking advantage of the fact that conditions (a), (b), (c) are jointly contradictory. In fact, what we want to prove is precisely that condition (c) must fail.
-If condition (a) fails then head(ψ η ) ∈ Σ t . Therefore, it is immediate that ψ η / ∈ Mon Σt (ψ η ) and so x ψη / ∈ X t Γ (ψ, η). Hence, x φ ∈ X t Γ (ψ, η) implies that φ ∈ sub(ψ η ) ⊆ sub(Γ) and φ = ψ κ for some κ < η, and the induction hypothesis ensures that φ ∈ Γ ω , as Γ 12 ψ τ τ ≤κ . Easily, as one knows that φ ∈ Mon Σt (ψ η ), it follows that skel Σt (φ) = x φ ∈ Γ t . Thus, we get that X t Γ (ψ, η) ⊆ Γ t .
As we know from (*) that Γ t , X t Γ (ψ, η) t skel Σt (ψ η ), we can conclude that Γ t t skel Σt (ψ η ). Given that ψ η ∈ sub(Γ), we can apply Lemma 3.7 and conclude that ψ η ∈ Γ ω .
-If condition (b) fails, then it is the case that ψ η = ψ κ for some κ < τ . Immediately, ψ η = ψ κ ∈ Γ ω , by induction hypothesis, since Γ 12 ψ τ τ ≤κ .
-If condition (c) fails, we know precisely that ψ η ∈ Γ ω .
The following result is a simple corollary of Proposition A.9, already hinted at just after Definition 3.5.
Corollary A.10. If Γ ⊆ L Σ12 (P ) then Γ ω = {φ ∈ sub(Γ) : Γ 12 φ}.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition A.9, property (2).
As another consequence of Proposition A.9, we finally obtain the envisaged characterization result. Proof. The result is immediate from Lemma A.7 and Proposition A.9, property (1).
